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We set out to answer three questions: (a) to what extent do (former) eU candidate 
countries differ from Western european countries regarding opposition to civil rights 
for legal migrants? (b) to what extent do the (former) eU candidate countries differ 
among themselves in terms of this particular anti-immigrant sentiment, that is, opposi-
tion to civil rights for legal migrants? and (c) to what extent can we explain such cross-
national differences, considering cross-national demographic or economic conditions, 
taking into account individual differences? We found that former eU candidate coun-
tries were really on comparable levels as eU member states in terms of opposition to 
civil rights for legal migrants. We found rather strong differences with countries like 
estonia, Latvia and Hungary standing out, whereas countries like Poland, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Lithuania and Turkey showed low levels. We found that these differences 
were (rather strongly) explained by the migrant stock in the country. although none of 
the other national characteristics turned out to reach significance, their parameters were 
in the direction we proposed.
Keywords:  ethnic exclusionism; civil rights; cross-national research; east versus 
west
Introduction and Questions
Resistance to migrants has been high on the public agenda in many Western 
european countries particularly over the last decades.1 Based on a cross-national and 
longitudinal study it has been shown that in many countries there has been a sub-
stantial increase in this resistance to migrants in the period between 1988 and 1994 
which thereafter leveled off.2 Less attention has been paid to the resistance to 
migrants in some of the (former) eU candidate countries,3 except for some studies 
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on data that are more than a decade old.4 Yet a recent overview on racist extremism 
in Central and east european (Cee) countries supposed that “anti-immigrant senti-
ments are increasing in Cee countries equalling if not overtaking the situation in the 
West, as yet without firm and up-dated cross-national empirical evidence.”5
This recent overview states that such anti-immigrant sentiments seem not to be 
due to racist extremist parties that have never been a major political force in Cee or 
to racist extremist organizations. Nor are such sentiments due to subcultures of skin-
heads and/or hooligans—how difficult it remains to truly compare these validly and 
reliably due to a lack of data.6 Considering the fact that all Cee countries have rati-
fied important international conventions, also on minority rights, we suppose that 
these provide legal frameworks to refrain citizens from these countries from treating 
their minorities unequally, to some extent. Yet the majorities of these countries may 
resist (the implementations of) these minority rights. actually, this overview ascer-
tains that in virtually all countries, elements of the racist extremist discourse have 
been found in mainstream parties which may have reinforced anti-immigrant senti-
ments in the public opinion. Considering these arguments ruling out a number of 
explanations, we will argue that these anti-immigrant sentiments may be due to other 
national and individual characteristics such as the ones that have been shown to 
explain anti-immigrant sentiments in Western european countries.7 This provides us 
with the possibility of testing theories from which these hypotheses on national 
characteristics have been derived more thoroughly.
In previous research, many aspects of anti-immigrant sentiments have been 
focussed at the overarching label of ethnic exclusionism.8 In this contribution, we 
will focus on some of these aspects for which rather recently, valid and reliable 
cross-national data have become available for Western european as well as for 
(former) eU candidate countries, among which are so many Cee countries. More 
particularly, we will focus on the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants as one 
of the core issues to indicate the level of equal treatment of minorities by majorities 
in (former) eU candidate countries. This issue is of particular relevance. Many of 
these legally administered migrants are entitled to stay in the country and have been 
granted a number of civil rights, at least formally speaking. However, ordinary peo-
ple do not discuss civil rights for migrants in formal terms. Opposition to civil rights 
for these legal migrants implies social exclusion of migrants, which in turn implies 
social non-integration that may induce interethnic tensions. This issue has become 
widely disseminated throughout the public and political arenas.
Then, the questions to be addressed are: (a) to what extent do (former) eU can-
didate countries differ from Western european countries regarding opposition 
to civil rights for legal migrants? (b) to what extent do the (former) eU candidate 
countries differ among themselves in terms of this particular anti-immigrant senti-
ment, that is, opposition to civil rights for legal migrants? (c) to what extent can we 
explain such cross-national differences, considering cross-national demographic or 
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economic conditions, taking into account individual differences that have been 
shown to be relevant for opposition to civil rights for legal migrants?
Theories and Hypotheses
We set out to explicate, first, theories and hypotheses about explanations on the 
contextual level to explain cross-national differences we expect to find and, second, 
hypotheses derived from these theories to explain differences at the individual 
level.
Cross-national Differences
In the early fifties, sociologists focused on societal causes of group conflicts as 
well as on societal conditions under which these conflicts arise, founding Realistic 
Conflict Theory9 claiming that each social system, characterized by competition 
over scarce resources (material resources, power and status) between social groups, 
such as ethnic groups, contains catalysts of antagonistic intergroup attitudes. The 
proposition was added that the dominant group has a sense of claims on these scarce 
resources over subordinate groups.10 Next, an analytical distinction between, on the 
one hand, actual competition and, on the other hand, perceived competition,11 using 
“actual competition” to refer to macro- or meso-level socio-economic conditions 
such as the availability of scarce resources. Moreover, it was suggested that actual 
competition may also refer to a micro level, that is, competition between individuals 
from different ethnic groups that hold similar social positions, for example, work in 
similar niches of the labor market.12 Finally, it was proposed that these actual com-
petitive conditions might affect the majorities’ perceptions of competition which in 
turn may induce hostile, unfavorable stances toward these out-groups.13 This argu-
ment was explained in a similar fashion later on,14 building on a classic study,15 
proposing a relationship between “external threat” and “perceived threat” to explain 
opposition to racial policies.
This line of theorizing started from the bedrock assumption,16 that dominant 
group members distinguish themselves affectively as group members from other 
subordinate out-groups. This distinction is linked with presumed traits of both the 
in-group and the out-groups. The latter proposition has been substantiated by a sec-
ond paradigm, that is, Social Identity Theory,17 according to which individuals have 
the fundamental need to achieve a positive social identity which induces them to 
perceive their in-group as superior to ethnic out-groups. Subsequently, they apply 
favorable characteristics that they perceive among members of the in-group to them-
selves via mental processes labeled as social identification, and they value out-groups 
negatively via mechanisms of social contra-identification. We propose that these 
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processes may intensify under the competitive conditions on which Realistic 
Conflict Theories focuses. Therefore, we consider Social Identity Theory to be com-
plementary to propositions from Realistic Conflict Theory, which we propose to 
refer to as Ethnic Group Conflict Theory, summarized in a core proposition: 
Intergroup competition, at an individual as well as at a contextual level, may rein-
force the mechanisms of social identification and contra-identification, eventually 
resulting in ethnic exclusionism. at the contextual level, competition refers to 
macro-social conditions. at the individual level, competition may be specified in 
terms of the social conditions of the individual members of ethnic groups.
ethnic group Conflict Theory offers a coherent explanation concerning the 
effects of societal circumstances on exclusionist reactions that can now be rigorously 
tested across countries that may be quite different in terms of contextual conditions 
both historically and contemporarily, such as the (former) candidate countries for the 
eU. The deduction that follows from the theory is that ethnic exclusionism varies 
with the level of actual competition within countries. We propose that the level of 
actual competition may be related to conditions where there are (a) increasing num-
bers of people competing for, ceteris paribus, approximately the same amount of 
scarce resources or (b) stable numbers of people competing for a decreasing amount 
of scarce resources. These conditions all imply, ceteris paribus, a stronger competi-
tion for scarce resources between the dominant group and ethnic out-groups. 
Following this rationale, also suggested by previous studies,18 we propose that oppo-
sition to civil rights for legal migrants will be stronger in countries where the actual 
level of ethnic competition is relatively high, more particularly in contextual condi-
tions of (1a) a relatively high proportion of resident migrants, (1b) a relatively high 
level of immigration, (1c) a relatively high number of asylum seekers and (1d) a high 
unemployment level. The actual level of available resources may be indicated by the 
gross domestic product (gDP), and therefore we propose to test that opposition to 
civil rights to legal migrants may be high in contextual conditions where (1e) the 
GDP is relatively low.
Individual Level Differences: Social Position and Religion
We use ethnic group Conflict Theory also to derive hypotheses with regard to the 
effects of individual characteristics on the opposition to civil rights for legal 
migrants. We propose that the level of ethnic competition can be expected to vary 
between social categories. Particularly those social categories that hold similar 
social positions as ethnic minorities19 or those social categories that live close to 
ethnic enclaves20 may experience higher levels of ethnic competition than average 
and may therefore deny more strongly civil rights to legal migrants. In many 
european countries, the overwhelming majority of non-autochthonous residents, 
immigrants and asylum seekers are located in the lower strata of society, also 
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very often concentrated in urban areas.21 This implies that lower-strata members of 
the european majority population who hold social positions comparable to those of 
ethnic minorities—that is, those with a low level of education or a low income level, 
those performing manual labor, those who are unemployed or those who live in 
urban areas—will have to compete more with immigrants on, for instance, the labor 
market. Hence, we expect that (hypothesis 2) opposition to civil rights for legal 
migrants will be strongly prevalent among social categories of the dominant group 
in similar social positions as ethnic out-groups, more particularly among (2a) peo-
ple with a low level of education, (2b) manual workers, (2c) unemployed people, 
(2d) people with low income and (2e) people living in urban areas.
as straightforward as these hypotheses may seem, they may not hold at all for 
these (former) eU candidate countries, following the line of reasoning recently 
developed.22 The principal argument is that in countries that suffer from major col-
lective threats (e.g., larger immigrant populations and poor economic conditions), 
differences between advantaged and disadvantaged groups may dampen, that is, 
these differences decrease, which boils down to non-significant differences between 
people from high versus low social classes. First, disadvantaged groups may react 
with despair rather than hostility toward minorities. Second, disadvantaged groups 
may perceive their situation to be less severe than for minorities. Third, disadvan-
taged majority groups may consider some kind of solidarity with minority groups. 
Yet there may be quite another reason why differences on resistance to minorities 
between particularly poorly and highly educated people may be small in these coun-
tries. The educational systems in these countries were highly centralized systems, 
with a considerable degree of standardization, to provide as much equality in oppor-
tunities for the stability and legitimation of the social order.23 Many people, social-
ized in this kind of system, may not have been exposed to the enduring effects that 
education has been shown to have in so many Western countries24 where the educa-
tional system is the main social institution for the transmission of the “official cul-
ture” considered to be enlightened and respectful to minority rights. Therefore, is 
was argued that such educational effects would be less strong in non- or less demo-
cratic systems for which elaborate cross-national evidence was delivered.25 Based on 
cross-national data collected in 1995, it was shown that the educational effect on 
aspects of ethnic exclusionism was less strong in recent democracies (like some of 
the [former] candidate countries) as compared to educational effects in long-stand-
ing democracies. This argument boils down to rejecting hypothesis 2a. Yet it was 
also proposed that some time lag was necessary to provide means to the “new” edu-
cational system to teach the new norms as well as the ones relating to aspects of 
ethnic exclusionism. This suspicion implies that the effects of education may only 
come to the surface among young cohorts who have actually gone through the sys-
tem over the last decade. Therefore, we will additionally test the hypothesis (3a) that 
the educational effect is present among the youngest cohort and is different from the 
educational effect among older cohorts.
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From quite a different perspective, evidence has been provided that religious 
people were rather prejudiced compared to non-religious people.26 In previous 
research which covered 11 european countries among which were some Cee coun-
tries, a simple linear relationship was found: the more frequently people attend 
church, the more exclusionism they display.27 Therefore, we expect that (hypothesis 4) 
church attendance is negatively related to opposition to civil rights for migrants.
Data
The Candidate Countries eurobarometer 2003.2 was collected in May 2003, car-
ried out by gallup Organization Hungary on request of the european Commission, 
Directorate–general Press and Communication and european Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia (eUMC). It covers citizens of each of the 13 countries that 
are applying for european Union membership. Of them, 10 became members in 
2004. Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey were by then still candidate countries. each 
target sample was 1,000 interviews, except for Cyprus and Malta, for which the target 
was 500 interviews. More information is available in gallup Organization Hungary 
(2004). The basic sample design applied is a multi-stage, random (probability) one. 
all interviews were face to face in the respondent’s home and in the appropriate 
national language. In countries with significant minorities the respondents had a 
chance to respond in their mother tongue (in estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in Russian 
and in Romania in Hungarian). The provided fieldwork control report shows that the 
response rate varies from 41.4% in estonia to 64.4% in Latvia. We decided to select 
only those respondents with the nationality of the respective country which of course 
differed strongly between countries. appendix a provides these data.
Measurements
Dependent variables
The eurobarometer in the candidate countries contained the same questions as the 
Standard eurobarometer of the eU member states. The question formulations of 
the eurobarometer for the candidate countries and the standard eurobarometer for 
the eU member states are identical. We analysed the same set of items as in analyses 
of the eU member states28 as to compare the level of different aspects of ethnic 
exclusionism between Western european countries and (former) candidate countries. 
We tested whether these items can be regarded as measurement instruments that are 
cross-nationally comparable, not only across candidate countries but also in com-
parison with the eU member states. To answer the question whether measurement 
instruments are equivalent across candidate countries and eU member states in 
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2003, we applied multi-sample analyses upon all 30 samples of the Standard 
eurobarometer 59.2 (17 samples in 15 countries, including separate samples of Northern 
Ireland and eastern germany) and the 2003 Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 
data (13 national samples). We concluded that many aspects of ethnic exclusionism 
were equivalently measured in all candidate countries and member states by the 
same items. Next to opposition to civil rights for legal migrants (e.g., “legally estab-
lished immigrants: should have the same rights, should have the right to bring imme-
diate family members in, should be able to become naturalised easily”), we 
ascertained cross-national valid measurements for resistance to multicultural society 
(e.g., “it is (not) a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different 
races, religions and cultures”), perceptions of limits to multicultural society (e.g., 
“there is a limit to how many people of other races . . . a society can accept”), 
favour repatriation policies for legal migrants (e.g., “legally established immigrants 
should all be sent back to their country of origin”), insistence on conformity to the 
law (e.g., “in order to be fully accepted members of our society, minority people 
must give up such parts of their religion and culture”).
Independent Variables at the National Level
The national statistical data for the countries included in the Candidate Countries 
eurobarometer 2003 are displayed in appendix B. Figures on the unemployment rate 
in 200229 were taken from eurostat,30 and they refer to the number of unemployed 
persons as a share of the total active population. The estimates of the number of 
unemployed are based on the results of the european Union Labour Force Survey. 
Unemployed persons are those aged 15 to 74 years not living in collective households 
who were without work within the two weeks following the reference week and have 
actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks or who 
found a job to start within a period of at most three months. We applied the unemploy-
ment rate in 2002, which is the figure that is prior to the data collection.
Figures on GDP were taken from eurostat31 (2003b). gDP is measured per head in 
thousands of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) at current prices, indexed at 100 for 
the 15 eU members, in the year 2002. Next, these relative figures were multiplied 
with the actual gDP per head in thousands for the eU to derive the actual gDP for 
each country. For Malta, eurostat did not report gDP figures after 1999. Since eurostat 
figures regarding the percentage of non-nationals were available only for a selection of 
Central and east european Countries, we had to find another indicator for the candi-
date countries. as an alternative indicator, we applied the size of the migrant stock as 
a percentage of the total population.32 The latest available figures available before the 
data collection took place refer to mid-year 2000 and define the migrant stock as the 
number of people who are born outside the country. For a subset of countries that did 
not have data on place of birth but had data on citizenship, the estimated number of 
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non-citizens is given. In both cases, the migrant stock also includes refugees, some of 
whom may not be foreign-born. For Slovakia and Bulgaria, the migrant stock was 
estimated by the United Nations Population Division applying a statistical model 
based on census data classified by place of birth or citizenship.
To take into account the effect of immigration, we took the average annual number 
of migrants and related it to the total population. For the eU candidate countries only 
the net migration was available for all countries. We derived the average annual net 
migration in the period 1995 to 2000, per 1,000 capita from the United Nations 
Population Division (2002).33 The average annual net migration is the net average 
annual number of migrants during the period, that is, the annual number of immigrants 
less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and non-citizens.
Finally, we took the average number of asylum applications in 2001 and 2002 per 
1,000 capita as an additional indicator. Figures regarding the number of asylum appli-
cations are quite suitable for international comparison as compared to other figures 
on asylum seekers, such as the number of admitted refugees. The number of asylum 
applications in each country is registered by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees.34,35 To take into account strong yearly fluctuations, we took the average 
number of asylum applications in the two years preceding the time of the survey, that 
is, in 2001 and 2002. To compare the burden of the absolute numbers of asylum 
applications across countries, we related this to the size of the total population.
Independent Variables at the Individual Level
To measure the first of our independent variables, educational attainment, we 
used information on the age at which respondents had stopped their full-time educa-
tion. We regarded educational attainment as an interval variable. In order to assign a 
numerical value for the respondents who were still studying at the time of survey, we 
took their age. Furthermore, to prevent extreme high scores on the educational 
attainment variable, we regarded the age of 30 as an upper limit.
a measure of social class was constructed, using the available information in 
these secondary data, to resemble the cross-national comparable categorisation.36 We 
distinguished a number of categories, based on their actual social position in the 
labour force: the higher professionals (including professionals, business proprietors 
and top management), the lower professionals (middle management), routine 
non-manual workers (people with an employed position at a desk, in service jobs or 
travelling), self-employed people (farmers, fishermen and shop owners), supervisors 
and skilled manual workers and a category of other (unskilled) manual workers and 
servants. To these classes we added as distinct categories the people who were momen-
tarily not active in the labour force: people working in their own household, students, 
unemployed people, and lastly, retired people and disabled people.
In the Candidate Countries eurobarometer dataset, no country-specific income 
questions were available. Instead, only a harmonised income variable was available 
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that measures the gross monthly household income in ten deciles. This harmonised 
income variable is comparable across countries. Missing data for household income 
were—for each country separately—imputed by an estimated value based on other 
information that is available for the respondents. We estimated missing income values 
by means of a regression analysis of household income on seven variables that are 
related to household income.
Urbanisation was measured by means of three categories ranging from “a rural 
area or village” or “a small or middle sized town” to “a large town,” as judged by the 
respondent. With regard to religious denomination, we distinguished between non-
religious people and religious people belonging to Christian or to non-Christian 
denominations. In addition, church attendance was also taken into account, ranging 
from never attending church, to rarely attending church (a few times a year or less) 
to frequently attending church (once a week or more). We constructed a dummy 
variable for those belonging to the youngest cohort (that is, those born after 1976, 
entering high schools around 1989). Finally, we included gender as a control variable 
in the analysis.
Analyses
First, we calculated the differences between (former) eU candidate countries and 
eU member state countries regarding the five dimensions of ethnic exclusionism that 
we distinguished. These are presented in Table 1. Next, we performed multi-level 
analyses on one particular aspect of ethnic exclusionism, that is, opposition to civil 
rights for legal migrants. We tested whether it would make sense to use this advanced 
analysis by estimating the difference in the log likelihood between a model contain-
ing only an intercept (individual level variation) with a model containing estimates 
for random variation at the country level. This clearly provided us with evidence that 
Table 1
Grand Mean Scores on Dimensions of Majority Population’s Attitudes
 (Former) eU  eU Member  
 Candidate Countries States
  Percentage   Percentage 
 Mean Support Mean Support
Resistance to multicultural society .41 28 .37 25
Limits to multicultural society .56 42 .70 60
Opposition to civil rights for legal migrants .40 38 .41 39
Favour repatriation policies for legal migrants .34 19 .35 22
Insistence on conformity to law  .57 45 .78 67
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Table 2a
Parameter Estimates from Multi-level Models on  
Opposition to Civil Rights in 13 (Former) Candidate EU Countries;  
Standard Errors in Parentheses (N = 9,541)
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.42 (0.04) 0.44 (0.05) 0.42 (0.03)
Individual characteristics   
  education  –0.35–2 (0.21–2) –0.352 (0.21–2)
  Occupation (higher professionals = reference)   
  Lower professionals  0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
  Routine non-manuals  0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
  Self-employed people  0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
  Skilled manuals  0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)
  Unskilled manuals  0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.03)
  Housewives   0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)
  Students  –0.02 (0.03) –0.02 (0.03)
  Unemployed people  0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
  Retired people  0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
  Income  –0.49–2 (0.12–2) –0.48–2 (0.12–2)
  gender: male (female = reference)   –0.00 (0.01) –0.00 (0.01)
  Urbanisation (rural area or village = reference)   
  Small or middle sized town  –0.02 (0.02) –0.02 (0.02)
  Large sized town  –0.01 (0.02) –0.01 (0.02)
  Religion (non-member = reference)  –0.03 (0.02) –0.03 (0.02)
  Church attendance (never = reference)   
  attend frequently  –0.01 (0.02) –0.01 (0.02)
  attend rarely   –0.00 (0.01) –0.00 (0.01)
  Cohort > 1976  –0.00 (0.02) –0.00 (0.02)
  Cohort × education  –0.16–2 (0.31–2) –0.15–2 (0.31–2)
Country characteristics   
  Unemployment: 2002   –0.00 (0.01)
  gross domestic product per capita: 2002   0.00 (0.02)
  Migrant stock: 2000   0.13–1 (0.04–1)
  Net migration: 1995-2000   0.01 (0.01)
  asylum applications: 2001-2002   0.05 (0.10)
  Variance components   
  Individual 0.12 0.12 0.12
  (Percentage explained)  (1.27) (1.27)
  Country 0.02 0.02 0.01
  (Percentage explained)  (6.53) (57.79)
Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < .05; italic parameters indicate significance at p < .10.
there are major differences between countries in this respect that will be shown in 
graph 1. Next, we included stepwise individual characteristics and country charac-
teristics to find out whether inclusion of these characteristics would improve the 
model fit, which it turned out to do. Therefore, we will present the results of these 
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analyses in Table 2 to ascertain which national characteristics actually affect opposi-
tion to civil rights for legal migrants.
Results
Let us first have a look at the major differences between eU member states and 
(former) candidate countries on different aspects of ethnic exclusionism. These are 
presented in Table 1.
Table 2b
Parameter Estimates from Multi-level Models on  
the Opposition to Civil Rights in 15 EU Member Countries;  
Standard Errors in Parentheses (N = 15,096)
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.40 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02) 0.38 (0.02)
Individual characteristics   
  education  −0.85–2 (0.14–2) −0.85–2 (0.14–2)
  Occupation (higher professionals = reference)   
  Lower professionals  0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
  Routine non-manuals  0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
  Self-employed people  0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
  Skilled manuals  0.06 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02)
  Unskilled manuals  0.08 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02)
  Housewives   0.05 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)
  Students  −0.02 (0.02) −0.02 (0.02)
  Unemployed people  0.06 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02)
  Retired people  0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
  Income  −0.01 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
  age  6.60–4 (0.00) 6.60–4 (0.00)
  gender: male (female = reference)  0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
  Urbanisation (rural area or village = reference)   
  Small or middle sized town  −0.02 (0.01) −0.02 (0.01)
  Large sized town  −0.03 (0.01) −0.03 (0.01)
Country characteristics   
  Unemployment: 2002   0.01 (0.01)
  gDP: 2002   −0.00 (0.00)
  Non-Western non-nationals: percentage in 2000   0.01 (0.01)
  Immigration non-eU nationals: 1995-1999   0.02 (0.01)
  asylum applications: 2001-2002   0.01 (0.02)
Variance components   
  Individual  0.14 0.13 0.13
  (Percentage explained)  (2.34) (2.34)
  Country 0.01 0.01 0.00
  (Percentage explained)  (0.00) (22.67)
Note: Bold parameters indicate significance at p < .05; italic parameters indicate significance at p < .10.
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We find that the level of support for some dimensions of ethnic exclusionism is 
quite similar in (former) candidate countries compared to eU member states. This is 
particularly true of opposition to civil rights for legal migrants (grand mean = .40 in 
candidate countries versus .41 in member states) and being in favour of repatriation 
policies for legal migrants (grand mean = .34 in candidate countries versus .35 in 
member states) and somewhat less so for resistance to multicultural society (grand 
mean = .41 in candidate countries versus .37 in member states). These findings 
imply similar proportions; that is, substantial minorities of the people living in can-
didate countries and member states share these views. Big differences between 
member states and candidate countries can be found regarding the view that limits 
to multicultural society have been reached (grand mean = .56 in candidate countries 
versus .70 in member states) and regarding the insistence on conformity of migrants 
to the law (grand mean = .57 in candidate countries versus .78 in member states). 
These findings imply larger proportions; that is, vast majorities of people living in 
member states hold the latter views whereas of the people living in candidate coun-
tries only a slight majority supports these views. These findings do certainly not 
support the hypothesis put forward by Mudde (2005) that (former) candidate coun-
tries are overtaking the position of Western countries in terms of anti-immigrant 
sentiments.
Next, we focussed on the opposition to civil rights for legal migrants to find out the 
differences between (former) candidate countries. These are presented in graph 1.
Graph 1
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We find that this particular aspect of exclusionist stances is strongly supported by 
people living in estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Malta and Cyprus but also to some extent 
in Slovakia and Slovenia. Much less support for this view is present in Poland, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Turkey.
Now let us consider differences between eU member countries in graph 2. 
This figure reveals that this kind of opposition is rather strong in Belgium, followed 
by germany (east and West), great Britain and austria, whereas Denmark, Finland 
and France are just above the eU mean. Well below the eU mean are the 
Mediterranean countries like Spain, Portugal, Italy and greece, but also Ireland and 
Northern Ireland.
Next, we present the results of the multi-level analyses in Table 2a. Regarding 
country characteristics, we ascertain a positive statistical effect of the migrants living 
in the country which suggests that: the more migrants, the more widespread the 
opposition to the granting of civil rights to them, supporting hypothesis 1a. 
additional analyses showed that this positive effect is due to the inclusion of estonia 
and Latvia, two countries that have a relatively large migrant stock (defined as non-
nationals, in particular Russians) and where the attitude towards granting migrants 
civil rights is less favourable, as shown in graph 1. although the effects of the other 
contextual characteristics—net migration and asylum applications—do not reach 
significance, they are in line with the hypotheses we proposed to test. None of the 
economic country characteristics reach significance—gDP and unemployment 
Graph 2
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level—implying that we have to refute hypotheses 1b through 1e. Yet a fairly large 
proportion of the variance at the country level is explained (57.89%).
Now, let us turn to the individual level effects. actually, we find (still) no signifi-
cant effect for educational attainment, hence rejecting hypothesis 2a. This finding is 
at odds with findings about eU member states as well as with our expectation that 
the educational systems of these (former) eU candidate countries meanwhile would 
have transformed and become similar institutions like the Western ones, producing 
enlightened and tolerant people. additionally, we tested whether the educational 
effect would be different between younger versus older cohorts. We found that the 
interaction term (educational attainment with the cohort variable) also did not reach 
significance, rejecting hypothesis 3a, which implies that this young cohort has not 
yet enjoyed the enduring effects of education.
Between occupational categories, however, we do ascertain significant differ-
ences. People performing unskilled manual work turn out to support this view rather 
strongly, followed by people performing skilled manual labour and people perform-
ing routine non-manual labour. These findings support hypothesis 2b. although the 
parameter of the category of housewives does not reach significance (at the .05 
level), it indicates that these categories also tend to oppose to civil rights for legal 
migrants. Strictly speaking, hypothesis 2c is rejected. The effect of income is nega-
tive, implying that the higher someone’s income, the less he or she opposes civil 
rights, supporting hypothesis 2d. None of the other individual level characteristics 
reach significance, which also implies that hypothesis 2e on people living in urban-
ized areas and hypothesis 4 on church attendance are rejected. The latter finding is 
at odds with previous research both in eastern and western european countries where 
it was found that the more people attend church, the more they are prejudiced toward 
ethnic minorities in their country.37
We like to emphasize that these results are predominantly consistent with compa-
rable findings and in some respects strikingly different from the results in eU member 
states, presented in Table 2b. In eU member states, we found other occupational cat-
egories significantly stronger in opposing civil rights for legal migrants than the refer-
ence category, like self-employed people and unemployed people. Next, we found 
gender differences and differences between urbanized people and those living in the 
countryside, the latter opposing more strongly civil rights. In these countries we found 
a strongly negative effect of education on opposition to civil rights which is more than 
often found in this line of research. However, with respect to country characteristics 
we find no significant effects, although all effects are in line with the proposed hypoth-
eses that as yet have to be refuted for these member states.
Conclusions and Discussion
In this contribution we set out to answer three pressing questions on anti-
immigrant sentiments in (former) eU candidate countries. The first one dealt with 
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the presupposition that the level of these anti-immigrant sentiments would be much 
stronger in some of these countries as compared to eU member states. However, we 
found no empirical evidence for this. Instead, in some respects, these (former) can-
didate countries showed lower levels, like on the view that there are limits to mul-
ticultural society and regarding the insistence on conformity to law. These findings 
should reduce at least some of the political worries that the level of prejudice in 
east european countries would be detrimental to the consolidation of democracies.38 
Remarkably, in some respects, the level of exclusionism was strikingly similar to 
that of the eU member states like for supporting repatriation policies and resistance 
to multicultural society, but also for the opposition to grant civil rights to legal 
migrants.
We considered the latter aspect of ethnic exclusionism to be crucial and therefore 
focussed on this issue to answer our second question, that is, on cross-national dif-
ferences. We found rather strong differences with countries like estonia, Latvia and 
Hungary standing out, whereas countries like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania 
and Turkey showed low levels.
To answer our third question, we set out to explain these cross-national differ-
ences, taking into account both national and individual level characteristics. We 
found that these differences were (rather strongly) explained by the migrant stock in 
the country, particularly high in estonia and Latvia where so many Russians live. 
although none of the other national characteristics turned out to reach significance, 
their parameters were in the direction we proposed: the level of asylum applications 
would probably be, at least to some extent, related to the relatively high level of 
opposition in countries like Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus.
In terms of individual level characteristics, we were struck by the finding that 
educational level (still) had no significant effect on the opposition to civil rights for 
legal migrants which is certainly at odds with much of the empirical evidence found 
in Western countries.39 In so many studies, a strongly negative effect was found, also 
on this particular aspect of ethnic exclusionism (as shown in Table 2b), implying that 
highly educated people are more respectful in terms of respecting civil rights for 
legal migrants as compared to poorly educated people. We also tested whether the 
educational effect would differ between young versus old cohorts, that is, between 
old cohorts who were educated during the old regimes as compared to young cohorts 
who were educated after the institution of new and democratically chosen regimes. 
We found, however, that such differences are as yet not present.
apart from these findings, we found strikingly similar social categories opposing 
civil rights for minority groups, like the people performing (un-)skilled manual work 
and people with low incomes. Moreover, we found that people performing routine 
non-manual work also opposed these civil rights. We like to consider these reactions 
to be consistent with the socio-economic interests of these social classes for which 
evidence was presented, based on the 1995 ISSP data.40 However, none of the other 
social categories that we supposed would oppose civil rights for legal migrants came 
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to the fore as such. It seems to be that differences between social categories in these 
(former) candidate countries are somewhat less pronounced than in eU member 
states. This finding is somewhat similar to previous findings.41 We like to emphasize 
that these results overall lend support to vital parts of ethnic group Conflict Theory, 
particularly the hypotheses on the social categories directly competing for scarce 
resources with legal migrants. However, hypotheses derived from this theory on 
cross-national differences are not strongly supported, similarly to findings in Western 
countries. actually, only the hypothesis on the migrant stock in the countries inducing 
the level of opposition to civil rights for legal migrants turned out to be supported. 
These non-significant findings together with the non-significant effect of education 
may call for other macro or contextual explanations outside of the realm of economic 
and demographic conditions, particularly on the grand societal institutions with 
some socializing power like the educational system but also the media via which 
politicians and public opinion leaders may affect the public opinion indirectly as has 
been suggested previously42 and shown previously for extreme right-wing voting in 
germany.43 Then the question becomes whether and to what extent it will be possible 
to construct cross-national comparable indices on the (longitudinal changes in the) 
number and substantial messages that are passed through these systems to the majori-
ties in these countries, inducing or reducing intergroup antagonisms. To the extent that 
such an endeavour may turn out to be fruitful, we will be able to test additional theo-
retical propositions.
Appendix A 
Number of Completed Interviews and Response Rate by Country
 Total Number  eU Population Percentage of   
 of Completed Response aged  Respondents with 
 Interviews Rate (%) 15+ (× 1,000) Country’s Nationality
estonia 1,006 41.4 1,360 65.4
Latvia 1,002 64.4 2,345 58.7
Lithuania 1,022 41.6 3,475 86.2
Poland 1,000 45.7 38,632 99.5
Czech Republic 1,000 56.9 10,226 97.4
Slovakia 1,035 52.2 5,331 88.4
Hungary 1,015 48.3 10,195 98.4
Romania 1,018 53.5 22,435 93.5
Bulgaria 1,000 62.0 7,891 90.8
Slovenia 1,000 42.6 1,980 95.0
Malta 500 47.7 386 99.2
Cyprus 500 59.2 689 99.8
Turkey 1,000 46.9 67,803 100.0
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Contextual Characteristics of EU Candidate Countries
 
    average annual 
   Migrant Stock average annual Number of asylum 
 Unemployment gDP in Percentage Net Migration applications in 2001 
 Rate in per  of Population in 1995–2000, and 2002, per  
Country 2002  Capita in 2000a per 1,000 Capita 1,000 Capita
estonia 9.1 10.03 26.2 –8.0 0.01
Latvia 12.8 8.45 25.3 –2.0 0.01
Lithuania 13.1 9.38 9.2 0.0 0.07
Poland 19.9 9.46 5.4 –0.5 0.12
Czech Republic 7.3 14.38 2.3  1.0 1.41
Slovakia 18.6 11.35 0.6  0.3 1.65
Hungary 5.6 13.58 3.0 –0.7 0.80
Slovenia 6.0 17.71 2.6  0.5 2.22
Malta 7.4 11.93  2.2  1.4 0.60
Cyprus 3.8 17.38 6.3 3.9 2.05
Romania 7.0 5.88 0.4 –0.5 0.08
Bulgaria 18.1 5.93 1.3  –4.9 0.33
Turkey 10.4 5.50 2.3 –0.8 0.07
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